The CNDP have agreed to support Kabila’s Majorite Presidentiel in the forthcoming Presidential and Legislative elections. Motivations for doing so are a matter of large speculation, and the role of regional powers seems to be key. The trade off for CNDP support appears to be causing disquiet internally and the political capacity of the CNDP to conduct normal activities is weak. Large concerns are being voiced vis-à-vis potential illegal activities that the CNDP have already, or may perpetrate during the voting.
The Conference National pour la Defence des Peuple (CNDP) signed a peace accord, which integrated their combatants into the command structure of the FARDC on 23 March 2009. With the arrest by the Rwandan Forces of Laurent Nkunda a few months previously and the installation of Bosco Ntaganda, the CNDP now holds significant command authority within the FARDC, and continues to operate parallel Police and Administration in large sectors of Masisi in the Petit Nord. They have agreed to campaign directly for the re-election of Kabila.
The CNDP remains extremely close to the RPF regime with their political leader, Phillipe Gafishi, a former bureaucrat from Rwanda directly nominated by Kagame via Ntaganda. Given the clear consensus that it is Kagame’s agenda to maintain Kabila as the president of the DRC; it doesn’t take a huge leap of deduction to surmise that the CNDP is installed within North Kivu to do the bidding of Kigali.
In addition to the presence of the CNDP, increasing evidence corroborates the fact that at the invitation of Kabila, up to 1200 Rwandan troops are stationed in various parts of the province. Analysis on their role in the run up to elections is that they could be a possible deterrent to opposition political groups establishing enclaves of opposition to a PPRD led central government.
The CNDP however have voiced discontent around the benefits that the alliance has for them. At present there is one provincial minister from the CNDP, but they hold no National Ministries. The PPRD has so far transferred no funds to the CNDP to carry out campaigning, and they have vociferously denounced this lack of financial support. Admittedly many cadres of the CNDP have been integrated into the FARDC and are on the payroll of the government, but if Kabila is successful in these elections, the CNDP will probably demand at least one national minister position.
In the zones currently under de facto CNDP administration, the control of the population is tight, and irregularities in the registration of illegitimate (underage, foreign) voters have been documented in internal reports of the MONUSCO. As we go into an electoral campaigning period there are fears that the CNDP will:
· Campaign/Intimidate the electorate to vote for Kabila
· Attempt electoral fraud (Ballot Stuffing, voters bussed from polling station to polling station).
· Preventing the electorate from voting
· Targeting non-Banyarwadna ethnic groups with violence.
In areas of weaker CNDP influence, specifically in the Grand Nord, there are fears that the deployment of integrated CNDP officers of the FARDC (such as the transfer of Colonel Eric to Beni) will increase the risk of ethnic violence between the Banyarwanda and the Nande people.
Its probably important to bear in mind that the Tutsi population of North Kivu is less than 5%, their strongest concentration are in Masisi and Jomba (Rutshuru) where they make up a mere 17 % of the population. The capacity of the CNDP to intimidate the populous and their enduring networks with other Congolese Armed groups means that this tiny ethnic minority has a sinister ability to punch above its own weight.
